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THE ANALYSIS I propose is inscribed within an overall historical
view of the expansion of capitalism, which I can not develop here1.
In this view, capitalism has always, since its origins, been a polariz-
ing system by nature, that is, imperialistic. This polarization –in
other words, the concomitant construction of dominant centers and
dominated peripheries and their ever deeper reproduction at each
stage– is inherent in the process of accumulation of capital operat-
ing on a worldwide scale, founded on what I have called “the global-
ized law of value.”
In this theory of the worldwide expansion of capitalism, the
qualitative transformations of the systems of accumulation between
one phase and another in its history construct the successive forms of
the asymmetrical, centers/peripheries polarization, that is, of concrete
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imperialism. The contemporary world system will, consequently, con-
tinue to be imperialistic (polarizing) in any possible future, so long as
the fundamental logic of its deployment continues to be dominated by
capitalist relations of production. This theory associates imperialism
with the process of capital accumulation on a worldwide scale, an
event that I regard as one sole reality with different dimensions, which
are, in fact, inseparable. It differs from the vulgarized version of the
Leninist theory of “imperialism as the higher phase of capitalism” (as
if the previous phases of the worldwide expansion of capitalism had-
n’t been polarizing) and from contemporary post-modernist theories
that term the new globalization “post-imperialistic2.”
From the permanent conflict among imperialisms to
collective imperialism
In its worldwide deployment, imperialism was always conjugated in
plural form, from its origins in the nineteenth century until 1945. The
conflict among imperialisms played a decisive role in the transforma-
tion of the world through the class struggle, by which the fundamen-
tal contradictions of capitalism are expressed. Social struggles and
conflicts among imperialisms were closely articulated and this articu-
lation is what has ruled the history of really existing capitalism. I point
out in this regard that the proposed analysis differs markedly from
that of the “succession of hegemonies.”
The Second World War triggered a greater transformation as
regards the form of imperialism: the substitution of a collective impe-
rialism, associating the group of centers of the capitalist world system
(for simplicity’s sake, the “triad”: the United States and its Canadian
outside province, Western and central Europe and Japan) for the mul-
tiplicity of imperialisms in permanent conflict. This new form of
imperialist expansion underwent diverse phases of development, but
is still present. The eventual hegemonic role of the United States,
about which it will be necessary to specify its foundations and the
ways in which it articulates with the new collective imperialism, must
be situated within this perspective. These issues underline problems
which are precisely the ones I would like to treat below.
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The United States obtained a gigantic benefit with the end of the
Second World War: the main combatants –Europe, the Soviet Union,
China and Japan– were ruined and America was in a condition to exer-
cise its economic hegemony, since it concentrated more than half the
industrial output of the world at that time and had exclusivity over the
new technologies that guided development in the second half of the
century. Additionally, the United States had exclusivity over nuclear
weapons –the new “absolute” weapon. At Potsdam the American tone
changed; days after the bombardment of Hiroshima and Nagasaki it
already wielded nuclear armament.
This twofold absolute advantage –economic and technological–
turned out to erode in a relatively brief time (two decades) through a
double recovery, economic for capitalist Europe and Japan, military
for the Soviet Union. We will thus recall how this relative pullback of
American power nourished an entire era in which there flourished the
discourse about the “American decline” and alternative hegemonies
even waxed (Europe, Japan, and later China).
Gaullism corresponds to this stage. De Gaulle considered that
the goal of the United States after 1945 had been control over the
entire Old World (“Eurasia”), and that Washington had managed to
make its pawns advance, destroying Europe –the real Europe, from
the Atlantic to the Urals, that is, including “Soviet Russia,” as he used
to say– by raising the specter of an “aggression” from Moscow in
which he did not believe. His analyses were, from my point of view,
realistic and perfect. But he was almost the only one to do this. The
counter-strategy that he proposed in the face of the “Atlantism” pro-
moted by Washington was based on Franco-German reconciliation as
the basis for conceiving the construction of a “non-American Europe,”
careful to keep Great Britain out of the project, since it was regarded,
and justly so, as the Trojan Horse of Atlantism. Europe could then
open towards a reconciliation with (Soviet) Russia. Reconciling and
bringing together the three great European peoples –French, German
and Russian– would put a definitive end to the U.S. project of world
domination. The inner conflict inherent in the European project can
be reduced to the choice between two options: an Atlantic Europe, the
American project, or a non-Atlantic Europe (integrated, within this
standpoint, with Russia). But this conflict hasn’t yet been resolved.
Ulterior developments –the end of Gaullism, the admission of Great
Britain into Europe, the growth of the East, the Soviet collapse– have
hitherto favored what I term the “suppression of the European proj-
74
NEW WORLDWIDE HEGEMONY. ALTERNATIVES FOR CHANGE AND SOCIAL MOVEMENTS
ect” and its “double dissolution in neoliberal economic globalization
and in the political and military alignment with Washington” (Amin,
2000). This evolution additionally nurtures the solidity of the collec-
tive nature of the imperialism of the triad.
Is this a “definitive” (not circumstantial) transformation? Will it
necessarily imply a United States “leadership” in one form or another?
Before attempting to answer these questions it is necessary to explain
with greater precision what the United States project consists of.
The project of the U.S. ruling class
The undertaking of extending the Monroe doctrine to the entire plan-
et didn’t spring, in all its insane and even criminal enormity, from the
head of President Bush Junior, to be put into practice by an extreme
right-wing junta that achieved power by a kind of coup d’état as a con-
sequence of dubious elections.
This is the project which the U.S. leadership class conceived
after 1945 and from which it has never deviated, although its enact-
ment has, quite obviously, undergone diverse vicissitudes. When on
the verge of failure it has only been possible to put it into practice with
the necessary consistency and violence at certain moments marked by
specific circumstances, such as ours as a consequence of the collapse
of the Soviet Union. 
The project has always allocated a decisive role to its military
dimension. Conceived at Potsdam, as I have earlier argued, this proj-
ect was grounded on the nuclear monopoly. Very quickly, the United
States launched a global military strategy, splitting the world into
regions and delegating responsibility for control over each of them to
a U.S. Military Command. I here again recall what I wrote before the
collapse of Soviet Russia regarding the priority assigned to the Middle
East is this global strategic vision (Amin and others, 1992). The goal
wasn’t only to “encircle the USSR” (and China likewise) but also to
obtain the means to make Washington the absolute ruler of all regions
of the planet. Put differently, to extend the Monroe Doctrine to the
entire planet –the doctrine that in fact gave the United States the
exclusive “right” over the New World in pursuance of what it defined
as its “national interests.”
In this way, “the sovereignty of the national interests of the
United States” was placed above all the other principles that frame the
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political behavior that is regarded as a “legitimate” means, developing
a systematic mistrust with regard to any supra-national right.
Certainly, the imperialists of the past had not behaved differently, and
those who seek to mitigate the responsibilities –and criminal behav-
ior– of the United States leadership at the present time, seeking
“excuses3,” must consider the same argument: that of indisputable his-
torical precedents.
We would have liked to see history change as appeared to be the
case after 1945. The conflict among imperialisms and the contempt
for international law, given the horrors that the Fascist powers caused
during the Second World War, were the elements that led to the U.N.
being founded on a new principle that proclaimed the illegitimate
nature of wars. The United States, we might say, did not endorse this
principle; rather it has, in addition, widely overridden its early initia-
tors. The day after the First World War, Wilson espoused founding
international politics anew on different principles than those which,
since the treaty of Westphalia (1648), had given sovereignty to monar-
chic states and later to more or less democratic nations, given that this
absolute character had been put into question by the disaster to which
it had led modern civilization. Little does it matter that the vicissi-
tudes of domestic policy in the United States should have postponed
the launching of these principles, since for example Franklin D.
Roosevelt, and even his successor Harry S. Truman, played a decisive
role in the definition of the new concept of multilateralism and in the
condemnation of war that went with it –the basis of the United
Nations Charter.
This beautiful initiative –one that was backed by the peoples of
the entire world of that time, and which indeed represented a qualita-
tive jump towards the progress of civilization– never enjoyed the con-
viction or the support of the leadership classes in the United States.
The authorities in Washington always felt ill at ease within the U.N.
and nowadays brutally proclaim what they had been forced to hide up
to this time: they do not accept even the concept of an international
law higher than what they consider to be the demands of the defense
of “their national interests.” I do not consider that it is acceptable to
find excuses for this return to the vision that the Nazis had developed
in their day when demanding the destruction of the League of
Nations. Preaching in favor of the law with as much talent and ele-
3 Such as, for example, Chaliand & Arnaud Blin (2003).
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gance as was done by Dominique de Villepin before the Security
Council is, unfortunately, only a “nostalgic look at the past” instead of
constituting a reminder of what the future should be like. On this
occasion the United States has defended a past that we thought had
been definitively left behind.
In the immediate postwar period American leadership was not
only accepted but requested by the bourgeoisies of Europe and of
Japan. Because although the reality of a threat of “Soviet invasion”
could only convince the weak in spirit, invoking it benefited not only
the right but the social democrats, with their adversarial cousins the
communists. It was possible to believe that the collective nature of the
new imperialism was only due to this political factor, and that once
Europe and Japan recovered their development they would seek to
unencumber themselves from the bothersome and useless tutelage of
Washington. But that wasn’t the case. Why?
My explanation requires going back to the growth of the nation-
al liberation movements in Asia and in Africa –the Bandung era, 1955-
1975 (Amin, 1989)– and the backing given to them by the Soviet Union
and China (each one in its own manner). Imperialism then found itself
forced to act, not only accepting peaceful coexistence in vast areas that
were wholly denied to it (“the socialist world”), but also by negotiating
the terms of the participation of the countries of Asia and Africa in the
imperialist world system. The alignment of the triad collective under
American leadership seemed to be useless for dominating the North-
South relations of the period. That is the reason that the Non-Aligned
found themselves facing a “Western bloc” that was virtually seamless.
The collapse of the Soviet Union and the vanishing of the
national-populist régimes born of the national liberation struggles
evidently made it possible for the United States’ project to be put vig-
orously into practice, especially in the Middle East, but also in Africa
and Latin America. Economic rule over the world on the basis of the
principles of neoliberalism, put into practice by the Group of 7 and
the institutions at its service (WTO, World Bank and IMF) and the
structural readjustment plans imposed on the Third World, are the
expression of this. At the political level, we can verify that at the ini-
tial moment Europeans and Japanese accepted to align themselves
with the United States’ project, during the Gulf war (1991) and later
in those in Yugoslavia and Central Asia (2002), acquiescing in the
sidetracking of the U.N. to the benefit of NATO. This initial moment
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h a s n ’t yet been surpassed, although some signs indicate a possible
ending as of the Iraq war (2003[a] and [b]).
The American ruling class proclaims without a shade of reti-
cence that it will not “tolerate” the rebuilding of any economic or mil-
itary power capable of questioning its monopoly of domination over
the planet and, to this end, assigns itself the right to lead “preventive
wars.” Three potential adversaries can be made out.
In the first place Russia, whose dismemberment constitutes the
United States’ greatest strategic objective. The Russian ruling class
doesn’t appear to have understood this to date. Rather, it seems to
have convinced itself that, after having “lost the war,” it could “win the
peace,” just as happened with Germany and Japan. It forgets that
Washington needed to help those two adversaries of the Second World
War, precisely to face the Soviet challenge. The new circumstances are
different; the United States has no serious competition. Its option then
is to definitively and utterly destroy the defeated Russian adversary.
Could it be that V. Putin has understood this and could Russia begin-
ning to dispel its illusions?
In the second place China, whose mass and economic success
worry the United States, the strategic objective of which is to dis-
member that great country (Amin, 1996: chapter VII).
Europe ranks third in this global vision held by the new owners
of the world. But in this case the American leadership doesn’t appear
to be concerned, at least not up to the moment. The unconditional
Atlantism of some (Great Britain and the new servile powers), the
“quicksand of the European project” (a point to which I shall return)
and the converging interests of the dominant capital in the collective
imperialism of the triad, contribute to the vanishing of the European
project, kept within its status as the “European mode of the United
States project.” Wa s h i n g t o n ’s diplomacy has managed to keep
Germany in its place and the reunification and conquest of Eastern
Europe have, apparently, reinforced this alliance: Germany has been
emboldened and is taking its tradition of “Eastward expansion” up
again. Berlin’s role in the dismemberment of Yugoslavia by virtue of
the recognition given to the independence of Slovenia and Croatia
was an expression of this (Amin, 1994), and, for the rest, it has been
invited to navigate in Wa s h i n g t o n ’s seat. Nevertheless, the German
political class appears hesitant and may be divided as to its strategic
options. The option of a renewed Atlantic alignment has, as a coun-
terpart, a strengthening of the Paris-Berlin-Moscow axis, which
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would turn into the most solid pillar of a European system inde-
pendent from Wa s h i n g t o n .
We can thus return to our central issue: the nature and eventu-
al solidarity of the collective imperialism of the triad and the contra-
dictions and weaknesses of its leadership by the United States.
The collective imperialism of the triad
and the hegemony of the United States
The world of today is militarily unipolar. Simultaneously, fractures
appear to be outlined between the United States and certain European
countries, as regards the political handling of a globalized system,
aligned –in the first instance– as a whole under the principles of free
trade. Are these fractures only circumstantial and of limited scope or
do they announce lasting changes? It would be necessary to analyze,
in all its complexity, the logic that guides the deployment of the new
phase of the collective imperialism (North-South relations in ordinary
language) and the objectives inherent in the United States’ project. It
is in this spirit that I will succinctly and successively broach five series
of questions.
The nature of the evolution that contributes to 
the setting up of the new collective imperialism
I suggest in this subsection that the constitution of the new collective
imperialism has its origin in the transformation of the conditions of
competition. Some decades ago, large corporations generally waged
their competitive battles in domestic markets, be they the United
States (the biggest national market in the world) or the European
states (despite their modest size). The victors of the national matches
could situate themselves advantageously on the world market. At the
present time, the size of the market needed to reach the first cycle of
matches is close to 500/600 million “potential consumers.” And it is
those who achieve such a market who prevail in their respective
national territories. A thorough globalization is the first framework of
activity of the large corporations. Expressed differently, in the domes-
tic/worldwide duo the terms of causality have been reversed: previ-
ously, the domestic power commanded a world presence; nowadays
it’s the other way around. In this way, transnational firms, whatever
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their nationality, have common interests in the handling of the world
market. These interests are superimposed on those permanent and
mercantile conflicts that define all the forms of competition inherent
in capitalism, whichever they be.
The solidarity of the dominant segments of transnational capi-
tal with all members of the triad is real, and is expressed in their affil-
iation with globalized neoliberalism. Within this perspective the
United States is considered the defender (militarily if necessary) of
their “common interests.” This doesn’t mean that Washington consid-
ers that it must “equably share” the profits of its leadership. The
United States is bent, on the contrary, on treating its allies as vassals
and is only disposed to allow minor concessions for its underlings in
the triad. Will this conflict of interests in the dominant capital reach
the point of entailing a rupture in the Atlantic alliance? It is not impos-
sible, but it is unlikely.
The place of the United States in the world economy
The generalized opinion is that the military potential of the United
States only constitutes the tip of the iceberg that extends its superior-
ity in all domains, economic, political, cultural. Submission to the
U.S. hegemony will thus be inevitable. I consider, on the contrary, that
in the system of collective imperialism the United States doesn’t enjoy
decisive economic advantages, given that its productive system is far
from being “the most efficient in the world,” since almost none of its
segments would win against its competitors in a truly open market
such as is imagined by neoliberal economists. Witness to this is the
worsening of its trade deficit. In virtually all segments of its produc-
tive system, including high-technology goods, profits have given place
to a deficit. The competition between Ariane and NASA’s rockets and
between Airbus and Boeing is witness to the vulnerability of the
American advantage. Against Europe and Japan in high-tech produc-
tion, against China, Korea and other industrialized countries of Asia
and Latin America as regards manufactured products of a banal
nature, and against Europe and the Southern Cone as regards agri-
culture. The United States would not win the competition if it did not
resort to “non-economic” means that violate the very principles of free
trade imposed on its competitors!
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The United States only has well-established comparative advantages
in the arms sector, precisely because the latter escapes markedly
from the rules of the marketplace and benefits from government
support. Undoubtedly, this advantage brings others with it in the
civilian sphere (the Internet is the best-known example) but it is
equally the cause of severe distortions and constitute handicaps for
many productive sectors.
The United States exists as a parasite to the detriment of its
partners in the world system. “The United States depends for ten per-
cent of its industrial consumption on goods whose import isn’t cov-
ered by exports of domestic products” (Todd, 2002). The world pro-
duces, the United States (whose national savings are virtually nil) con-
sumes. “The advantage” of the United States is that of a predator
whose deficit is covered by the contributions of others, with their con-
sent or by force. The means put into practice by Washington to com-
pensate for its deficiencies are of a diverse nature: repeated unilateral
violations of the principles of free trade, arms exports and search for
oil profits (which presupposes the agreement of its producers, one of
the real motives for the wars in Central Asia and Iraq). The main part
of the American deficit is met by capital contributions originating in
Europe and Japan, the South (wealthy oil countries and the purchas-
ing classes in all the countries of the Third World, including the poor-
est ones), to which we might add the bleeding imposed in the name of
servicing the debt imposed on virtually all countries on the periphery
of the world system.
The growth of the Clinton years, glorified as the product of a
“free-trade policies” that Europe unfortunately resisted, is fictitious
and cannot become generalized, because it rested on capital transfers
that implied the encumbrance of its partners. In all segments of the
real productive system, U.S. growth has not been better than
E u r o p e ’s. The “American miracle” fed exclusively on the growth in
expenditure caused by the worsening of social inequalities (financial
and personal services: legions of lawyers and private security forces,
etc.) In this sense, Clinton’s free-trade approach provided a good
grounding for the conditions that allowed the reactionary takeoff and
ultimate victory of Bush Junior.
The causes that originated the weakening of the United States’
productive system are complex and structural. The mediocrity of the
general educational and training systems, and the tenacious preju-
dice that favors private services to the detriment of public services,
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are among the main reasons of the profound crisis that American
society is undergoing.
It should therefore surprise us that Europeans, far from reach-
ing these conclusions that become manifest on verifying the insuffi-
ciency of the economy of the United States, should strive to imitate it.
The liberal virus doesn’t explain everything either, although it has
some roles that are useful to the system, such as that of paralyzing the
left. Privatization to the hilt and the dismantling of public services will
only manage to reduce the comparative advantages which the “Old
Europe,” as Bush calls it, still benefits from. But whatever the dam-
ages they will cause over the long term, these measures offer the dom-
inant capital, which lives on the short term, the occasion for supple-
mentary profits.
The goals of the U.S. project
The hegemonic strategy of the United States is situated within the
framework of a new collective imperialism.
(Conventional) economists lack the analytical tools that would
allow them to understand the full importance of the first of these
goals. Don’t we hear them repeat to exhaustion that in the “new econ-
omy” the raw materials provided by the Third World will lose their
importance and that, consequently, the latter will be ever more mar-
ginal within the world system? Against this naive and empty dis-
course, the Mein Kampf of the new Washington administration4 con-
fesses that the United States considers it has the right to appropriate
all the natural resources of the planet to satisfy its consumers first.
The rush for raw materials (oil, water and other resources) is already
before us in all its virulence. Especially so in the cases of resources
that are running out, not only because of the exponential cancer trig-
gered by wasteful Western consumption, but also because of the
development of the new industrialization in the peripheries.
At the same time, a respectable number of the countries of the
South are destined to turn into ever more significant industrial pro-
ducers, both within their domestic markets and on the world market.
Importers of technology, of capital, but also competitors in exports,
they will be present with increasing weight in the world equilibrium.
4 I refer to The National Security Strategy of the United States of America, announced in 2002.
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This doesn’t involve only some countries in east Asia (like Korea), but
the immense China and, tomorrow, India and the big countries of
Latin America. Now then, far from this being a factor of stability, the
acceleration of capitalist expansion in the South can only be the cause
of violent conflicts, internally and internationally. Because this expan-
sion cannot, under the conditions in the periphery, absorb the enor-
mous labor force that is concentrated there. In this sense, the system’s
peripheries are “tempest areas.” The centers of the capitalist system
experience the need to exercise their domination over the peripheries
and to subject their people to the ferocious discipline demanded for
the satisfaction of their priorities.
Within this perspective, the American leadership has under-
stood perfectly that, to preserve its hegemony, it enjoys three decisive
advantages over its European and Japanese competitors: control over
the natural resources of the globe, the military monopoly and the
weight exerted by “Anglo-Saxon culture, through which the ideologi-
cal dominance of capitalism is preferentially expressed. The systemat-
ic application of these three advantages explains many aspects of
United States policy, especially the systematic efforts carried out by
Washington for control over the oil-producing Middle East, its offen-
sive strategy vis-à-vis Korea –taking advantage of that country’s “finan-
cial crisis”– and vis-à-vis China, and the subtle maneuvering that seeks
to perpetuate divisions in Europe (mobilizing Britain, its uncondi-
tional ally, to this end), and hindering a serious rapprochement
between the European Union and Russia. At the level of global control
over the planet’s resources, the United States enjoys decisive advan-
tages over Europe and Japan. Not only because it is the only world
military power, for which reason no strong intervention in the Third
World can be carried out without it, but because Europe (excluding
the former USSR) and Japan lack the resources essential for the sur-
vival of their economies. For example, their dependence in the energy
area will be considerable for a long time, even though it decrease in
relative terms. Taking control –militarily– over this region with the
war in Iraq, the United States has demonstrated that it is perfectly
conscious of the usefulness of this means of pressure vis-à-vis its
allies-competitors. Previously, Soviet power had understood this vul-
nerability of Europe and of Japan and certain Soviet interventions in
the Third World had had the aim of reminding them of it, in order to
lead them to negotiate in some other field. Evidently, the above-men-
tioned deficiencies might have been compensated via a serious
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European-Russian rapprochement (Gorbachov’s “common house”).
That is the reason why the danger of that construction in Eurasia was
experienced by Washington as a nightmare.
The conflicts that pit the United States against its 
partners in the triad
Although the partners in the triad share common interests in the world-
wide management of collective imperialism in their relations with the
South, they also have a potentially serious conflictive relationship.
The American superpower exists thanks to the capital flows that
feed the parasitism of its economy and of its society. The vulnerabili-
ty of the United States constitutes, in this sense, a serious threat to
Washington’s project.
Europe, in particular, and the rest of the world, in general, will
have to choose between one of the two following strategic options: to
employ the “surplus” capital (from “savings”) it possesses to finance
the United States deficit (vis-à-vis consumption, investment and mili-
tary expenditure), or to conserve these surpluses and invest them in
themselves.
Conventional economists ignore the problem, on the basis of a
(senseless) hypothesis by which “globalization” will suppress nation-
states, and it won’t be possible to manage economic greatnesses (sav-
ings and investments) at an international level. This is a tautological
reasoning which in its very premises implies the conclusions at which
we seek to arrive: to justify and accept the financing of the United
States’ deficit by the others because, at world level, we shall find equal-
ity between savings and investment!
Why is this ineptness accepted? Undoubtedly, the teams of “of
wise economists” that exist in the European political classes (and in
others, such as those in Russia and China) from the electoral right and
left wings are themselves the victims of the economicist alienation
that I call the “liberal virus.” Furthermore, this opinion expresses the
political judgement of large transnational capitals, which consider
that the advantages obtained from the management of the globalized
system by the United States on behalf of the collective imperialism
override its disadvantages: the tribute that must be paid to
Washington to ensure its own permanence. Because it constitutes trib-
ute and not a business with guaranteed good profitability. There are
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countries ranked as “indebted poor nations” that are forced to ensure
the service on their debt at any price. But there are also “indebted
powerful nations” that enjoy all the means that would allow them to
devalue their debt if they considered it necessary.
The other option for Europe (and the rest of the world) would
consist in putting an end to the transfusion in the United States’ favor.
The surpluses could then be put to use in the places of origin and the
economies be relaunched. Because the transfusion demands the sub-
mission of the Europeans to “deflationary” (an incorrect term
employed by conventional economics and that I would replace by
“sentenciary”) policies, so as to be able to produce a surplus of
exportable savings. This slows down the progress, always mediocre, of
Europe with regard to the artificially sustained progress of the United
States. Conversely, the mobilization of this surplus for local employ-
ment would make it possible to simultaneously relaunch consumption
(through the reconstruction of the social dimension of an economic
management devastated by the liberal virus), investment –particularly
in the new technologies (and the financing of its research)– and even
military expenditure (putting an end to the American “advantages” in
that sphere). A choice in favor of this response to the challenge implies
a new balance in social relations in favor of the working classes.
Conflicts among nations and social struggles are articulated in this
manner. In other words, the United States/Europe contrast doesn’t
pose a fundamental opposition between the interests of the dominant
segments of capital of the various partners but is the result, above all,
of the differences in their respective political cultures.
The theoretical problems suggested by the preceding
reflections
The complicity/competition among the partners in the collective
imperialism for control over the South (sacking of its natural
resources and subjection of its peoples) may be analyzed from vari-
ous different angles and viewpoints. In this regard, three observations
seem essential to me.
First observation: the contemporary world system, which I term
collective imperialism, isn’t “less” imperialist than the preceding ones.
It isn’t an “Empire” of a “post-capitalist” nature. I consequently pro-
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pose a criticism of the ideological formulations of the “disguise” that
is nurtured by this “à la mode” dominant discourse5.
Second observation: it is worth while to give a reading to the
history of capitalism, globalized from its outset, anchored in the dis-
tinction among the various phases of imperialism (relations among
centers/peripheries). Of course, there exist other readings of this same
history, especially if they are articulated around the “succession of
hegemonies” (Amin,1996: chapter III). Personally I harbor some reser-
vations with regard to the latter. For a start, and in essence, because it
is “West-centric,” in the sense that it considers that the transforma-
tions that take place in the heart of the system, at its centers, decisively
–and almost exclusively– govern the global evolution of the system. I
believe that the reactions of the peoples of the peripheries in the face
of imperialist deployment must not be underestimated because they
caused the independence of America, the great revolutions undertak-
en in the name of socialism (Russia and China), and the reconquest of
the independence of the Asian and African countries, and because I
don’t think we can account for the history of world capitalism without
taking into account the “adjustments” that these transformations have
imposed on the central capitalism itself. The history of imperialism, it
seems to me, has been constructed more by the conflicts of the impe-
rialisms than by the type of “order” that the successive hegemonies
have imposed. The periods of apparent “hegemony” have always been
very brief and the hegemony in question is a very relative thing.
Third observation: globalization is not a synonym of “unifica-
tion” of the economic system by means of the “unregulated opening of
markets.” The latter –in its successive historical forms (yesterday’s
“free trade,” today’s “free enterprise”)– has only been a project of the
dominant capital. In actual fact, this program has almost always been
forced to make adjustments in the face of demands that do not form
part of its internal, exclusive and own logic. It has only been possible
to put it into practice at brief moments of its history. The “freedom of
commerce” promoted by the greatest industrial power of its period
–Great Britain– was only effective over two decades (1860-1880) which
were followed by a century (1880-1980) characterized by conflict
among the imperialists and by the strong disconnection of the so-
called socialist countries (as of the Russian revolution in 1917, and
later that in China, and the more modest one of the countries of
5 Cf. Note 2.
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national populism (Asia and Africa, 1955-1975). The current moment
of reunification of the world market (“free enterprise”), inaugurated
by neoliberalism starting in 1980, has extended to the entire planet
with the Soviet collapse. The chaos that the latter has generated testi-
fies to its character as a “permanent utopia of capital,” phrase I
applied to it in Empire of Chaos (Amin & Anderson, 1992).
The Middle East in the imperialist system
The Middle East, with its ancient extensions into the Caucasus and
the formerly Soviet Central Asia, occupies a position of particular
importance in the geostrategy/geopolitics of imperialism and, singu-
l a r l y, in the hegemonic project of the United States. This position is
due to three factors: its oil wealth, its geographical position at the
heart of the Old World and the fact that it currently constitutes the
“belly” of the world system.
Access to relatively inexpensive oil is vital to the economy of
the dominant triad and the best means to see that this access is guar-
anteed consists, properly understood, in ensuring political control
over the region.
But the region likewise owes its importance to its geographical
position, at the same distance from Paris, Beijing, Singapore and
Johannesburg. In other times, control over this inescapable thorough-
fare gave the Caliph the privilege of extracting the greatest profits
from the globalization of his time (Amin, 1996: chapters I and II).
After the Second World War the region, located on the southern flank
of the USSR, occupied, owing to this fact, an important position with-
in the strategy of encircling Soviet power militarily. And the region has
not lost its importance despite the collapse of the Soviet adversary,
because by setting itself up there, the United States could simultane-
ously reduce Europe to vassal status and subject Russia, China and
India to a permanent blackmail born of military intervention if it were
necessary. Control over the region thus effectively allows the extension
of the Monroe doctrine to the Old World, which constitutes the objec-
tive of the American hegemonic project.
The efforts continuously and constantly deployed by
Washington since 1945 to ensure control over the region –shutting the
British and French out– hadn’t been crowned with success up to the
moment. Let us recall the failure of the attempt to associate the region
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to NATO through the Baghdad Pact, and later the fall of the Shah of
Iran, one of its most faithful allies.
The reason was simply that the project of Arab (and Iranian)
nationalist populism was in conflict with the goals of the American
h e g e m o n y. This Arab project had the ambition to force the powers to
recognize the independence of the Arab world. That was the meaning
of the “non-alignment” formulated in Bandung in 1955 by the set of
liberation movements of the peoples of Asia and Africa which had the
wind in their sails. The Soviets quickly grasped that by providing
their support to this project they would keep Wa s h i n g t o n ’s aggressive
plans in check.
But history turned this page over, basically because the nation-
al populist project of the Arab world quickly exhausted its potential for
transformation and because the nationalist powers turned into dicta-
torships without a program. The vacuum created by this state of drift
cleared the path for political Islam and for the Gulf’s obscurantist
autocracies, preferential allies of Washington’s. The region turned into
one of the bellies of the global system, producing situations that
allowed foreign interventions (including military ones) that the
régimes in power were unable to contain –or even discourage– owing
to their lack of legitimacy vis-à-vis their peoples.
The region constituted –and constitutes– within the American
geomilitary map that covers the entire planet an area considered of
top priority (as does the Caribbean), i.e., an area where the United
States has invested itself with the “right” to intervene militarily. And
since 1990 it hasn’t foregone doing so!
The United States operates in the Middle East in close coopera-
tion with Turkey and Israel, its faithful and unconditional allies.
Europe has remained outside the region, accepting that the United
States act alone in defense of the triad’s vital global interests, namely,
their oil supply. Despite the evident signs of irritation after the Iraq
war, Europeans continue as a group to navigate in the region in
Washington’s wake.
At the same time, Israel’s colonial expansionism constitutes a
real challenge. Israel is the only country in the world that refuses to
recognize definitive borders (and therefore lacks the right to be a
member of the United Nations). As did the United States in the nine-
teenth century, Israel considers it has the “right” to conquer new areas
and to treat the peoples that inhabit the new territories, colonized for
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thousands of years, like Redskins. Israel is the only country that open-
ly declares not to consider itself involved by the resolutions of the UN.
The war of 1967, planned together with Washington since 1965,
obeyed diverse aims: to dampen the collapse of the national-populist
régimes, break their alliance with the Soviet Union, force them to
reposition themselves under American orders and open new lands for
Zionist colonization. In the territories conquered in 1967 Israel put
into practice a system of apartheid inspired in that of South Africa.
And it is at this point that the interests of the dominant world
capital come together with those of Zionism. Because a modernized,
rich and powerful Arab world would question the guaranteed access
of Western countries to the sacking of their oil resources, a necessary
condition for a continuation of the wastefulness associated with capi-
talist accumulation. The political powers of the countries of the triad,
faithful servants of the dominant transnational capital, do not want a
modern and powerful Arab world to exist.
The alliance between the Western powers and Israel is thus
founded on the solidity of their common interests. This alliance is nei-
ther the product of a feeling of guilt among the Europeans, responsi-
ble for anti-Semitism and the Nazi crime, nor of the skill of the
“Jewish lobby” in exploiting that feeling. If the Western powers
thought that their interests weren’t aligned with those of the Zionist
colonial expansionism, they would speedily find the means to over-
come their “complex” and neutralize the “Jewish lobby.” I am not one
of those who naively believe that public opinion in democratic coun-
tries imposes itself on the powers. We know that opinion is “manufac-
tured” too. Israel would be incapable of a lengthy resistance against
blockade measures (even moderate ones), such as the Western powers
have imposed on Yugoslavia, Iraq and Cuba. It would then not be at
all difficult to make Israel be reasonable and to create the conditions
for a true peace, if this were desired. But it isn’t.
The day after the defeat of 1967, Sadat declared that since the
United States held “ninety percent of the cards” in its hands (that was
the expression he used), it was necessary to break with the USSR and
realign with the Western bloc, and that, thanks to this, it would be
possible to obtain from Washington the concession that would exer-
cise sufficient pressure on Israel to force it to be reasonable. Beyond
this “strategic idea” of Sadat’s –the inconsistency of which was proven
by subsequent events– Arab public opinion remained widely incapable
of understanding the dynamics of world capitalist expansion, and
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much less of identifying its real contradictions and weaknesses. Don’t
we hear it said and repeated that “Westerners would over the long
term understand that it was to their own interest to maintain good
relations with the two hundred million Arabs –their immediate neigh-
bors– and not sacrifice those relations over an unconditional support
for Israel?” This implies considering implicitly that the “Westerners”
in question (that is, the dominant capital) wish there to be a modern-
ized and developed Arab world, and not understanding that, on the
contrary, they wish to maintain it in impotence, and that to this end,
support for Israel is useful to them.
The choice made by the Arab governments (save for Syria and
Lebanon) of backing the American plan of a pretended “definitive
peace” could not lead to different results than the ones it did: embold-
ening Israel to make its pawns advance in its expansionist project.
Now openly rejecting the terms of the “Oslo Accords” (1993), Ariel
Sharon only demonstrates what we should have understood earlier
–that it wasn’t a project for “definitive peace,” but the starting point of
a new stage of the Zionist colonial expansion.
The state of permanent war that Israel, along with the We s t e r n
powers that back its project, impose on the region, constitutes a pow-
erful reason that allows the autocratic Arab systems to perpetuate
themselves. This blockage, vis-à-vis a possible democratic evolution,
weakens Arab opportunities for renewal and allows the deployment
of the dominant capital and the American hegemonic strategy. The
knot is tied: the American-Israeli alliance perfectly suits the interests
of both partners.
Initially, the apartheid system launched after 1967 gave the
impression of being able to achieve its goals. The scared handling of
daily affairs in the occupied territories by the notables and by the trad-
ing bourgeoisie seemed to be accepted by the Palestinian people. The
PLO, removed from the region following the invasion of Lebanon by
the Israeli army (1982), seemed to lack the means –from its faraway
exile in Tunis– to question the Zionist annexation.
The first Intifada burst out in December 1987. An explosion of
apparently “spontaneous” appearance, it expressed the irruption into
the scene of the popular classes, and particularly of its most impover-
ished sectors, confined in the refugee camps. The Intifada boycotted
Israeli power via the organization of systematic civic disobedience.
Israel reacted brutally, but was unable to restore either its police
power efficaciously or that of the Palestinian middle classes. On the
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contrary, the Intifada called for a mass return of the exiled political
classes, the setting up new local forms of organization and the espous-
al by the middle classes of the unleashed liberation struggle. The
Intifada was triggered by youths, initially not organized within the for-
mal networks of the PLO (Fatah, devoted to its chief Yasser Arafat, the
DFLP, the PFLP, the Communist Party) which immediately joined the
Intifada and won the sympathy of the majority of its Chebab. The
Muslim Brotherhood, left behind due to the weakness of its activities
during the preceding years, despite some actions by Islamic Jihad,
made its appearance in 1980, and gave way to a new expression of
struggle: Hamas, constituted in 1988.
As this first Intifada, after two years of expansion, exhibited
signs of exhaustion, given the violent repression of the Jews (use of
firearms against children, closure of the “green line” to Palestinian
workers, the almost exclusive source of income for their families, etc.),
the scene was set for a “negotiation” initiated by the United States that
led to the Madrid agreements (1991) and later to the peace calls in
Oslo (1993). These agreements allowed the return of the PLO to the
occupied territories and their transformation into a “Palestinian
Authority” (1994).
The Oslo accords imagined a transformation of the occupied
territories into one or several Bantustans, definitively integrated into
Israel’s space. Within this framework, the Palestinian Authority should
only be a false State –like those of the Bantustans– and, in actual fact,
be the transmission belt of the Zionist order.
Having returned to Palestine, the PLO, transformed into an
Authority, managed to establish its order, not without some ambigui-
ties. Within its new structures, the Authority absorbed the majority of
the Chebab that had coordinated the Intifada. It achieved legitimacy
through the election of 1996, in which the Palestinians participated
massively (eighty percent), while Arafat caused a plebiscite to confirm
him as president of that Authority. The Authority remained, neverthe-
less, in an ambiguous position: would it accept the role that Israel, the
United States and Europe invested it with, that of the “government of
a Bantustan,” or would it align itself with the Palestinian people that
refused to submit?
As the Palestinian people rejected the Bantustan project, Israel
decided to repudiate the Oslo agreements, which it had nevertheless
dictated the terms of, to substitute them by the employment of military
violence pure and simple. The provocation at the Mosques, carried out
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by the war criminal Sharon in 1998 (but with the support of the Labor
government that provided him with the means for the assault), and the
triumphal election of this criminal at the head of the government of
Israel (with the cooperation of the “doves” against Shimon Peres), were
the cause of the second Intifada, currently underway.
Will the latter manage to liberate the Palestinian people from
the outlook of subjection planned by the Zionist apartheid? It is too
soon to say. In any case, the Palestinian people now have at their dis-
posal a true national liberation movement with its specific character-
istics. It isn’t in the “sole party” style, with the appearance (rather, the
reality) of “unanimity” and homogeneity. It has components that pre-
serve their own personality, their visions of the future, even their ide-
ologies, their militants and their clients, but which, apparently, are
able to reach a mutual understanding to carry out the struggle jointly.
Control over the Middle East is certainly a key piece within
Washington’s project for world hegemony. How does the United States
therefore imagine it will ensure control? Ten years ago Washington
had already taken the initiative of moving forward with the curious
project of a “Middle Eastern common market,” in which the Gulf
countries would have contributed the capital, and the other countries
the cheap labor, reserving for Israel the technological control and the
role of forcible intermediary. Accepted by the countries of the Gulf and
Egypt, the project faced the rejection of Syria, Iraq and Iran. In order
to move forward it was thus necessary to topple those three regimes.
Now then, this has already been done in Iraq.
The problem then is knowing what type of political régime must
be imposed that will be capable of maintaining this project.
Washington’s propagandistic discourse speaks of “democracy.” In real-
ity, Washington only busies itself in substituting autocracies born of
an outdated populism with obscurantist, allegedly “Islamic” autocra-
cies (compelled by respect for the cultural specificity of the “commu-
nities”). The renewed alliance with a political Islam described as
“moderate” (i.e., capable of keeping the situation in hand efficiently
enough to forbid any sliding into “terrorism” –that which is aimed
against, and only against, the United States, of course) constitutes the
axis of Washington’s political option, remaining as the only possible
option. It is within this perspective that reconciliation with the archa-
ic autocracy of the system will be sought.
Faced with the deployment of the American project, Europeans
invented their own project, calling it a “Euro-Mediterranean society.”
92
NEW WORLDWIDE HEGEMONY. ALTERNATIVES FOR CHANGE ANDSOCIAL MOVEMENTS
A bold project, filled with talk, but which likewise proposed to “rec-
oncile the Arab countries with Israel.” At the same time that they
excluded the Gulf countries from the “Euro-Mediterranean dialogue,”
the Europeans recognized that handling them was exclusively
Washington’s responsibility (Amin 2003 [d]).
The contrast between the reckless audacity of the American
project and Europe’s weakness is a beautiful indicator that the
Atlantism that actually exists ignores any sharing (the splitting of
responsibilities and association in decision-taking, placing the United
States and Europe in equal conditions). Anthony Blair, who considers
himself the advocate of the construction of a “unipolar” world,
believes he can justify this option because the Atlantism that would be
allowed would be founded on sharing. Washington’s arrogance under-
cuts this vain hope further every day, even though it may serve simply
to deceive European opinion. The realism of the intention of Stalin,
who had said at the time that the Nazis “didn’t know where to stop,”
is applicable to the junta that governs the United States. And the
“hopes” that Blair attempts to revitalize resemble those that Mussolini
placed on his ability to “calm down” Hitler.
Is another European opinion possible? Does Chirac’s discourse,
opposing the “unipolar Atlantic” world (apparently understanding well
that the United States’ unilateral hegemony reduces the European proj-
ect to being solely the European mode of Wa s h i n g t o n ’s project) against
the construction of a “multipolar” world, announce the end of Atlantism?
For this possibility to become a reality, it would still be necessary
for Europe to be able to emerge from the quicksand on which it skids.
The quicksand of the European project
All European governments up to now have allied themselves with the
thesis of liberalism. This alliance means nothing other than the end of
the European project, its double dissolution, economic (the advan-
tages of the European economic union being dissolved within eco-
nomic globalization) and political (Europe’s political and military
autonomy disappears). There no longer exists, at this time, any
European project. It has been substituted by a North Atlantic project
(or potentially that of the triad) under American command.
The “made in U.S.A.” wars have certainly awakened public opin-
ion and even certain governments (in the first place that of France, but
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also those of Germany, Russia and China). Nevertheless, these gov-
ernments haven’t put into question their faithful alignment with the
demands of liberalism. This major contradiction must be overcome in
one way or another, be it by submitting to Washington’s demands, be
it through a real break that puts an end to Atlantism.
The most important political conclusion I extract from this
analysis is that Europe won’t be able to emerge from Atlantism as long
as the political alliances that define its power blocs remain centered
on the dominant transnational capital. Only if social and political
struggles should manage to modify the content of these blocs and
impose new historic compacts between capital and labor will Europe
be able to take some distance with respect to Washington, an event
that would, in consequence, allow the rebirth of an eventual European
project. Under such conditions Europe might –indeed should– commit
itself equally at the international level, in its relations with the East
and with the South, to another path, different from the one set out by
the exclusive demands of collective imperialism, thus dampening its
participation in the long march “beyond capitalism.” Stated different -
ly, Europe will be leftist (the term “left” here being employed most
seriously) or it won’t be Europe.
Conciliating an adherence to liberalism with the affirmation of a
European political autonomy is the goal of certain fractions of the
European political classes concerned with preserving the exclusive posi-
tions of big capital. Will they be able to achieve it? I strongly doubt it.
In counterpoint, will the European popular classes be able to
overcome the crisis they face? I believe it possible, precisely for the
reasons that cause the political culture of certain European countries,
at least, to be different from that of the United States, and a renais-
sance of the left could take place. The condition is evidently that they
free themselves from the virus of liberalism.
The “European project” was born as the European mode of the
Atlantic project of the United States, conceived the day after the
Second World, within the spirit of the “Cold War” launched by
Washington –a project with which the European bourgeoisie, simulta-
neously weakened and fearful of its own working classes, aligned itself
in a practically unconditional manner.
Nevertheless, the deployment itself of this project –of doubtful
origin– has progressively modified important aspects of the problem
and of its challenges. Western Europe managed to put an end to its
economic and technological backwardness with respect to the United
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States. At the same time, the Soviet enemy is no longer there. The
deployment of the project brought together the main adversaries that
for a century and a half had marked European history: the three
biggest countries on the continent –France, Germany and Russia–
achieved mutual reconciliation. All this evolution is, from my point of
v i e w, positive, and is filled with an even more positive potential.
C e r t a i n l y, this deployment is inscribed within economic bases
inspired by the principles of liberalism, but a liberalism tempered
until the 1980s by the social dimension taken into consideration by
and through the “historic social-democratic commitment,” which
forced capital to adjust to the demands for social justice expressed by
the working classes. Afterward the deployment continued within a
new social framework, inspired by an “American-style,” utterly anti-
social liberalism.
This last turn has hurled European societies into a multidimen-
sional crisis. For a start there is the economic crisis of the neoliberal
option. A crisis worsened by the alignment of the European countries
in the face of the economic demands of their American leader, the for-
mer consenting to finance the latter’s deficit to the detriment of their
own interests. Then the social crisis, heightened by the growth of the
resistance and of the struggles of the popular classes against the fatal
consequences of the conservative option. Lastly, the attempt at a polit-
ical crisis –the refusal to align themselves, at least unconditionally, with
the United States option in the endless war against the South.
How will the European peoples face this triple challenge?
Europeans are divided into three different groups:
- Those who defend the neoliberal option and accept the leader-
ship of the United States, virtually without conditions.
- Those who defend the neoliberal option, but would wish for
a politically independent Europe, outside the American align-
m e n t .
- Those who would wish for (and struggle for) a “social Europe,”
that is to say, capitalism tempered by a new social commitment
between capital and labor operating on a European scale, and
simultaneously a political Europe practicing “other relations”
(friendly, democratic and peaceful) with the South, Russia and
China. The overall public opinion in all Europe has, during the
European Social Forum (Florence 2000) and on the occasion of
the war against Iraq, expressed its sympathy for the principles
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of this position.
There are certainly others, the “non-Europeans,” in the sense
that they do not think that any of the pro-European options are pos-
sible or desirable. These are still in a minority, but are certainly
called on to become strengthened within one of two fundamentally
d i fferent options:
- A right-wing “populist” option, which rejects the progression of
supranational political –and even economic– powers, with the
obvious exception of those of transnational capital.
- A popular left-wing, national, citizen-based, democratic and
social option.
What are the forces on which each of these tendencies lean and what
are their respective chanced of success?
The dominant capital is liberal by nature. In this sense, it logi-
cally supports the first of these three options. Anthony Blair represents
the most consistent expression of what I have termed the “collective
imperialism of the triad.” The political class, gathered behind the star-
spangled banner, is ready, if it becomes necessary, to “sacrifice the
European project” –or at least to dispel any illusion in that regard–
employing contempt for its origins: being the European mode of the
Atlantist project. But Bush, like Hitler, does not conceive any allies
other than unconditionally aligned subordinate ones. That is the rea-
son why significant segments of the political class, including the right
–even though the latter is, in principle, the defender of the interests of
the dominant capital– reject aligning themselves with the United
States as they yesterday did with respect to Hitler. If there is a possi-
ble Churchill in Europe, he would be Chirac. Will he be?
The strategy of the dominant capital may reach accommodation
within a “right-wing anti-Europeanism,” which would be content with
demagogic nationalist rhetoric (wielding the issue of emigrants, for
example) while submitting in actual fact to the demands of a liberal-
ism that isn’t specifically “European,” but globalized. Aznar and
Berlusconi constitute the prototypes of these allies of Washington’s.
The servile political classes of Eastern Europe are equally so.
In this regard, I believe that the second option chosen by the
most important Europeans (France-Germany) is hard to sustain. Does
it express the ambitions of a sufficiently powerful capital to be able to
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emancipate itself from the tutelage of the United States? I have no
answer save to indicate that intuitively I see it as rather unlikely.
This option is, nevertheless, that of the allies in the face of an
American adversary that constitutes the main enemy of all humanity.
I am persuaded that, if they persist in their choice, they will have to
face the logic of the unilateral project of that capital (liberalism) and
to seek alliances on the left (the only ones that might strengthen their
project of independence vis-à-vis Washington). The alliance among
sets two and three is not impossible. Just as was the case with the anti-
Nazi alliance.
If this alliance takes shape, will it have to operate exclusively
within the European framework if they are all incapable of renounc-
ing the priority given to that framework? I don’t think so, because this
framework, as constituted, systematically only favors the option of the
first, pro-American group. Would it thus be necessary to cause Europe
to burst apart and definitively renounce its project?
I don’t consider that necessary either, or even desirable. Another
strategy is possible: that of allowing the European project to “lie dor-
mant” for some time in its current stage of development, and in a par-
allel manner build other alliance axes.
A first priority, then, is the construction of a political and
strategic Paris-Berlin-Moscow alliance, extended to Beijing and Delhi
if it were possible. And I say specifically political with the aim of giv-
ing it the international pluralism and all the roles they ought to have
within the United Nations. Strategic, in the sense of building up mil-
itary forces capable of meeting the American challenge. These three
or four powers have all the means (economic, technological and
financial), reinforced by their military traditions, alongside which the
United States pales. The American challenge and its criminal ambi-
tions are imposed by virtue of their unrestrained character. Building
an anti-hegemonic front is currently as high a priority as in the past
it was to build an anti-Nazi alliance.
This strategy would reconcile the “pro-Europeans” with groups
two and three and with the “non-Europeans” on the left. Favorable
conditions would be created for later taking up a European project
again, which would probably also incorporate a Great Britain freed
from its subjection to the United States and an Eastern Europe that
has cast off its servile culture. We must be patient because this will
take quite some time.
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No progress of a European project will be possible insofar as the
American strategy isn’t deflected from its course.
Europe in the face of its own Arab South and the
Mediterranean
The Arab World and the Middle East occupy a decisive spot in the
hegemonic project of the United States. The response that the
Europeans offer to the American challenge in the region will be one of
the decisive tests that the European project itself will face.
The problem consists in knowing if the coastal people of the
Mediterranean and its prolongations –Europeans, Arabs, Tu r k s ,
Iranians and the people of the countries of Africa– will or will not ori-
ent themselves towards a representation of their security that differs
from that which is guided by the primacy of the preservation of
America’s world hegemony. Pure reason ought to cause them to evolve
in that direction. But up to the moment Europe has given no sign of
going that way. One of the reasons that might partly explain the
European inertia is that the partners in the European union, albeit not
too divergent, bear a coefficient of relative priorities that differs great-
ly from one country to the next. The Mediterranean façade isn’t cen-
tral to the industrial polarization of developed capitalism; the façades
of the North Sea, of the American Atlantic Northeast and of central
Japan have a density lacking a common denominator. For the people
in Northern Europe –Germany and Great Britain– the danger of chaos
in the countries located to the South of the Mediterranean does not
loom as seriously as it does for Italians, Spaniards and Frenchmen.
The diverse European powers each had, until 1945,
Mediterranean policies of their own, often conflicting ones. After the
Second World War, the states of Western Europe had practically no
Mediterranean or Arab policy, whether individually or in common,
beyond that which was implied in the alignment demanded by the
United States. Within this framework, Great Britain and France,
which had their colonial possessions in the region, fought to preserve
their advantages. Great Britain gave up Egypt and Sudan (1954) and,
after their defeat in the adventure of the tripartite aggression (1956), a
violent change of direction ensued which, in the late ’60s, implied the
abandonment of their influence in the coastal countries of the Gulf.
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France, eliminated since 1945 from Syria, finally accepted the inde-
pendence of Algeria (1962), but preserved a certain nostalgia for its
influence in the Maghreb and in Lebanon, emboldened by the local
ruling classes, at least in Morocco, Tunis and Lebanon. In parallel
fashion, the construction of Europe did not substitute the withdrawal
of the colonial powers by a new common policy operating in this
sense. Let us recall that, after the Israeli-Arab war of 1973, the prices
of oil were readjusted and the European Community, startled in its
dreams, discovered it had “interests” in the region. But this awakening
did not trigger any significant initiative on its part, for example with
regard to the Palestinian problem. Europe, both in this domain and in
others, continued to vegetate and ultimately to be inconsistent. Some
progress in the direction of autonomy vis-à-vis the United States was
seen in the ’70s, but after the Venice Summit (1980) it was eroded dur-
ing the ’80s, to finally disappear with the alignment alongside
Washington that was adopted during the Gulf War. It’s for this reason
that European perceptions regarding the future of the relations
between Europe and the Arab and Iranian World must be studied on
the basis of analyses pertinent to each one of the European states.
Great Britain has no Mediterranean or Arab policy that is spe-
cific to it. In this domain, and in others of British society in all its
political expressions (Conservatives and Laborites), the option has
been an unconditional alignment with the United States. It is, in this
case, a fundamental historical choice, which far surpasses specific cir-
cumstances and that considerably reinforces the submission of
Europe to the demands of American strategy.
For different reasons, Germany has no specific Arab or
Mediterranean policy either and will probably not attempt to develop
any in the near future. Weakened by its division and its Status, the
FRG devoted all its efforts to its economic development, accepting
having a low and ambiguous political profile with regard to the United
States and the Europe of the EEC. In an initial instance, the reunifi-
cation of Germany and its reconquest of full international sovereignty
did not modify this behavior; rather, on the contrary, they accentuated
the expressions of it. The reason is that the dominant political forces
(conservatives, liberals and social democrats) chose to give priority to
the expansion of Germanic capitalism in central and eastern Europe,
reducing the relative importance of a common European strategy,
both on the political level and on that of economic integration. It
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remains to be seen if this trend has currently been reversed, as seems
to be suggested by Berlin’s attitude in the face of the Iraq War.
France’s positions are more nuanced. A both Atlantic and
Mediterranean country, the heir of a colonial Empire, classed among
the victors of the Second World War, France did not give up express-
ing itself as a power. During the first postwar decade, succeeding
French governments attempted to preserve the colonial positions of
the country through anti-Communist and anti-Soviet Atlantist posi-
tions. Nevertheless, they did not gain Washington’s support, as was
demonstrated by the position of the United States during the tripartite
aggression against Egypt (1956). The Mediterranean and Arab policy
of France was simply retrograde. De Gaulle simultaneously broke with
paleo-colonial and with pro-American illusions, and conceived the
triple project of modernizing the French economy, leading a decolo-
nization process that would allow its substitution by neocolonialism
in the face of the old formulas, and compensating the weaknesses
intrinsic to any medium-sized country like France through European
integration. Within this last perspective De Gaulle conceived a Europe
capable of being autonomous, not only at the economic and financial
level, but also at the political level and even, ultimately, at the military
level, just as he conceived, over the long term, the association of the
USSR with the construction of Europe (“the Europe from the Atlantic
to the Urals”). But Gaullism did not survive its founder and, starting
in 1968, French political forces, both of the classic right and of the
socialist left, gradually returned to their previous attitudes. Their
vision of the construction of Europe became reduced to the sole
dimension of a “common market” between France and Federal
Germany (at the moment when German reunification occurred, in
Paris they were a bit surprised and uneasy...) and to the invitation,
employing pressure, made to Great Britain to join the EEC (forgetting
that Britain would be the Americans’ Trojan Horse in Europe).
Naturally, this change implied the abandonment of any Arab policy
worthy of the name of France, that is to say, a policy that went beyond
the simple defense of immediate mercantile interests. At the political
level, France objectively behaved, both in the Arab world and in sub-
Saharan Africa, as a supplementary force in support of the American
strategy of hegemony. It is within this framework that one must place
the Mediterranean discourse, which calls for tying the Maghreb coun-
tries to the European chariot (in the same way that Turkey, now in cri-
sis, was tied), which implied breaking the prospect of a unitary Arab
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approach and abandoning the Mashrek in the face of Israeli-American
intervention. Undoubtedly, the Maghreb’s ruling classes bear responsi-
b i l i t y, given the sympathy they demonstrated for this project.
Nevertheless, the Gulf Crisis dealt a strong blow to this project, and
the popular masses of Northern Africa expressed, on this occasion and
strongly, their solidarity with the Maghreb, a totally foreseeable event.
Italy is, including because of its geographical position, a coun-
try that is very sensitive to Mediterranean problems. This does not
mean that it has a real Mediterranean and Arab policy, and much less
that the latter has efficacy and autonomy. Because of its marginal
capitalist development, Italy was forced to inscribe its Mediterranean
ambitions within European tutelage in an alliance with other powers
in the area, more decisive than it is itself. Since its unity was achieved
in the middle of the last century with Mussolini’s fall in 1943, Italy
hesitated between an alliance with the owners of the Mediterranean
–i.e., with Great Britain and France– or with those able to contest
Anglo-French positions, namely the Germans. Atlantism, which is
exercised in Italy within a vision that implies a foreign political pro-
file under the tutelage of the United States, has been dominant in the
actions and options of Italian governments since 1947. It is equally
dominant, albeit from an even more ideological standpoint, among
certain sectors of the lay bourgeoisie (the republicans and liberals,
and some socialists). Because among the Christian Democrats there
exists the pressure of the universalism of the Catholic tradition. For
this reason it is significant that the Pope has, often, adopted more ret-
rograde positions vis-à-vis the Arab peoples (particularly on the
Palestinian problem) and the Third World than that of the numerous
Italian and Western governments in general. The step to the left by
part of the Catholic Church, under the influence of Latin America’s
Theology of Liberation, currently reinforces this universalism, of
which we find lay versions in pacifist, ecologist and pro-Third Wo r l d
movements. The “mittel” European current has its roots in the Italian
nineteenth century and in the North-South split that Italian unity
h a s n ’t managed to mitigate. Allied to the interests of large Milanese
capitals, it proposes bestowing priority on the economic expansion of
Italy toward the European East, in close association with Germany.
Within this framework, Croatia currently constitutes an immediate
objective. Properly understood, this option would imply that Italy
continue the tradition of a low international profile, and above all
remain marginal in its relations with the Mediterranean South. A par-
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allel option by Spain would isolate it even further from the European
concert, reducing it to its lowest common denominator. The
Mediterranean current, which is still weak, despite the contribution
that universalism could entail for it, is, for this reason, expressed in a
“Levantine” version: it is a question of “doing business” here or there,
without worrying about the framework of political strategy in which
the latter are inscribed. To acquire another, more noble consistency,
associating Italy to economic openings that are inscribed within a
perspective of reinforcing its autonomy and that of its Arab partners,
it would be necessary for a convergence to be achieved between this
project and universalist ideas, particularly those of part of the Italian
left, communist and Christian. The Italian right, for its part, reunited
under the leadership of Berlusconi in power, has opted to be
inscribed under the tutelage of the Washington-London Atlantic axis.
The behavior of the police forces during the G8 meeting in Genoa
(July 2001) clearly expresses this option.
Spain and Portugal occupy an important spot in the geostrategy
of world hegemony of the United States. The Pentagon considers, in
fact, that the Azores-Canaries-Gibraltar-Balearics axis is essential for
keeping watch over the North and South Atlantic and looking after the
entry into the Mediterranean. The United States forged its alliance
with those two countries immediately after the Second World War,
without exercising the least concern over their fascist nature. On the
contrary, in fact, the anti-communism of the Salazar and Franco dic-
tatorships served the American hegemonic cause well, making it pos-
sible for Portugal to be admitted into NATO and to establish American
bases of prime importance on Spanish soil. In counterpart, the United
States and its European allies backed Portugal unreservedly until the
end of its failed colonial war.
The democratic evolution of Spain after Franco’s death was
not the occasion for a questioning of the country’s integration into
the American military system. On the contrary, in fact, the formal
accession of Spain to NATO (in May 1982) was the object of real elec-
toral blackmail that made it out that participation in the EEC
demanded that accession, which was opposed by the majority of
Spanish public opinion.
Afterward, Madrid’s alignment with Washington’s positions has
been unreserved. In counterpart, the United States may apparently
have intervened to “moderate” Morocco’s claims and even to attempt
to convince Great Britain with regard to Gibraltar. In this sense, we
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may doubt the actual reality of these interventions. The reinforced
Atlantist alignment of Madrid translated into radical changes in the
organization of the Spanish armed forces, described by analysts as a
“movement toward the South.” In the Spanish tradition, in fact, the
army was spread out over the country’s entire territory. Additionally
conceived –with Franco, in an evident manner– as a domestic police
force more than as a force aimed outward, the Spanish army contin-
ued to be rustic and, despite the marked attention that the supreme
power in Madrid bestowed on the cadres of generals and officers, had
not been the object of a true modernization, as was the case with
France, Great Britain and Germany.
The socialist governments, and afterwards those on the right,
proceeded to a reorganization of Spanish forces to combat on a poten-
tial “Southern front” and committed themselves to a modernization of
the land army, of the aviation and of the navy. This change, demanded
by Washington and NATO, is one of the numerous manifestations of
the new American hegemonic strategy, substituting the South for the
East in the defense of the West. This is accompanied in Spain by a new
discourse that brings into evidence a “hypothetical enemy coming
from the South,” the identification of which leaves no room for doubt.
Curiously, this discourse of the democratic (and socialist) Spanish
media recalls the old tradition of the Reconquest, very popular among
the Catholic circles of the army. The change in the Spanish armed
forces is thus the sign of a determination on Spain’s part to exercise an
active role in the midst of NATO, in the framework of the reorienta-
tion of Western strategies, foreseeing interventions in the Third World.
For some time now, the Iberian Peninsula constitutes the first
stopover on the Washington-Tel Aviv axis, the principal European
bridgehead of the American Rapid Deployment Force (which had a
decisive role in the Gulf War), completed with bases in Sicily (which,
likewise, had never seen service until the operations against the Arab
World such as Libya, the Israeli bombardment of Tunis, etc.) and,
curiously, the facilities awarded by Morocco. Evidently, this Western
option empties the “Euro-Arab” discourse of any serious content. The
new, democratic Spain, which pretends to activate a policy of friend-
ship in the direction of Latin America and the Arab World, has actu-
ally directed its steps in an opposite direction from that of the
demands of its proclamation of principles.
The right-wing government led by Aznar has confirmed this
Atlantist alignment of Madrid’s. Even more than Italy, Spain rejects
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capitalizing on its Mediterranean position to the benefit of a new
European policy aimed at the Arab World, Africa and the Third
World, and to distance itself from the demands of the American hege-
m o n y. The French idea of a Mediterranean group in the midst of the
European Union remains, for these reasons, suspended in mid-air
and without serious points of support. At the same time, in the eco-
nomic sphere, Spanish capital, the heir of the Francoist tradition, has
placed its main hopes for expansion on the development of agree-
ments with Germany and Japan, invited to participate in the mod-
ernization of Catalonia.
While it existed, the line of East-West confrontation passed
through the Balkans. The compulsory alignment of the states of the
region with Moscow or Washington –with the sole exception of
Yugoslavia since 1948 and of Albania as of 1960– had placed a damper
on the local nationalist disputes that had turned the Balkans into the
European backyard.
Turkey placed itself in the Western camp since 1945, after hav-
ing put an end to its neutrality with regard to Hitler’s Germany. The
Soviet claims to the Caucasus formulated by Stalin following victory
were rejected by Ankara thanks to Washington’s resolute support. In
counterpart, Turkey, a member of NATO, despite its less than demo-
cratic political system, housed the American bases closest to the
USSR. There is no doubt that Turkish society continues to be part of
the Third World, although after Atatürk the country’s ruling classes
have proclaimed the European part of the New Turkey, knocking on
the door of a European Union that doesn’t want it. A faithful ally of the
United States and of its European partners, will Turkey wish to
reclaim its past and play an active role in the Middle East, making the
West pay for the services it might provide for it in that region? It
appears that the problem of the Kurds, whose very existence it fails to
recognize, has hitherto led it to hesitate in the adoption of this option.
The same applies to a potential pan-Turanian option, suggested by cer-
tain Kemalist circles, and later consigned to the historycal museum.
But currently, the breakup of the USSR might constitute an invitation
for the power of Ankara to take the leadership of a Turkish bloc that,
from Azerbaijan to Sinkiang, would dominate Central Asia. Iran
always expressed its fears with regard to a development of this type,
which would not only question the status of Iran’s southern Azerbaijan
but also the security of its vast northern Asian border with
Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan.
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Greece did not enlist in the Soviet camp. It was compelled and forced
by the British intervention of 1948 to align with the United States. In
conformity with the Yalta Agreements, the USSR, as we all know,
abandoned the Greek resistance to its fate, a resistance led by the
Communist Party which, nevertheless, in that country as in Yugoslavia
and Albania, had freed the nation and for that reason conquered
majority popular support. In this way, the Westerners were forced to
give their support against that movement to successive repressive
regimes and, lastly, to a dictatorship of fascist colonels, without seeing
this as a major contradiction with its discourse, according to which
NATO would protect the “free world” against the totalitarian “Satan.”
The return of Greece to democracy, through PASOK’s electoral victory
(1981), risked, under these conditions, questioning the country’s fideli-
ty to NATO. The European Community then came to Washington’s
support in order, as in the case of Spain, to link the Greek candidacy
to the EEC with its continuing participation within the Atlantic
alliance. This integration into the EEC was strongly discussed by
Greek public opinion at the time. Papandreou’s choice to join despite
everything, after some hesitation and in spite of the Third World and
neutralist principles of PASOK, appears to have unleashed an irre-
versible evolution even at the level of mindsets, flattering the Greek
p e o p l e ’s aspirations towards modernity and Europeanism.
Nevertheless, Greece’s new European partners haven’t offered that
country much, keeping it all the time in the position of poor relative
in the construction of the community.
Athens’ faithfulness to the Euro-American West hasn’t earned it
real support in its conflict with Turkey. Indeed, even though the Greek
dictatorship bore a measure of responsibility in the Cypriot tragedy
(1974), the open Turkish aggression (operation Attila) and the later
creation of a Turkish Republic of Cyprus, in clear violation of the
island’s status, not only have been accepted, but probably also
endowed with the services of the Pentagon, in the face of which
Europe once again gives way. It is evident that, to the United States,
friendship with Turkey, a considerable regional military power, ranks
far above Greece, however democratic the latter may be.
The Balkans-Danube region as a group (Yugoslavia, Albania,
Hungary, Romania and Bulgaria) in 1945 came under Moscow’s aegis,
be it through Soviet military occupation and acceptance by the Yalta
partners, or through their own liberation and the choice of that option
by the people of Yugoslavia and Albania.
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Ti t o ’s Yugoslavia, isolated during the years 1948-1953, between
M o s c o w ’s ostracism and Western anti-Communism, had successfully
achieved a strategy of construction of a “non-aligned” front, which
earned it a friendship with the Third World, particularly after the
Bandung Conference (1955). Analysts of the period’s geostrategic think-
ing curiously point out that this approach was not very sensible given
the country’s Mediterranean dimension. Perhaps Italy’s abandonment
after the Second World War of its traditional visa requirements and the
solution found in 1954 to the difficult problem of Trieste were the rea-
sons for this “historical forgetfulness.” Yugoslavia lived after that as a
state concerned above all with the problems of balance in its regional
relations and, especially, by that of the world balance between the super-
powers. Because, in the first place, it had managed to capitalize on the
double Northward and Danubian attraction of Croatia and Slovenia and
the Russian and Balkanic one of Serbia. The rapprochement initiated by
Khrushchev and continued by his successors, recognizing Ti t o ’s neu-
trality as positive in the world arena, as well as the weakening of the
régimes of the Warsaw Pact as of the ’60s and especially in the ’70s, for
a time guaranteed Yu g o s l a v i a ’s security, which had ceased to be regard-
ed as the crux of any regional conflict. Yu g o s l a v i a ’s diplomacy was then
able to deploy in the international arena, giving the country a dispro-
portionate weight in regard to its size. But, although this diplomacy had
undoubtedly gained points in Asia, in Africa and in Latin America, it
failed in Europe, where its call for an expansion of the neutrals’ front
never found a favorable echo. Nevertheless, vis-à-vis the Europe of
N ATO, from the North to the South of the continent, between two adver-
sarial military pacts, Sweden, Finland and Austria might have been able
to seek positive common initiatives that differed from the spirit of the
Cold Wa r. Later, the Greece of PASOK attempted to expand the
European neutral field, this idea leading in 1982 to the proposal for
cooperation toward the de-nuclearization of the Balkans, aimed, simul-
t a n e o u s l y, at certain member countries of the two alliances (Tu r k e y,
Romania and Bulgaria) or at neutrals (Yugoslavia and Albania). These
proposals also found no echo at all.
The decomposition of Southeastern Europe as of 1989 changed
the entire problem. The erosion and then the collapse of the legitimacy
of the régimes –founded on a specific development, whatever their lim-
itations and their negative aspects may have been– caused the bursting
apart of the unity of the leading class, the fractions of which attempt-
ed to found their legitimacy on nationalism. The conditions were pro-
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vided not only for allowing the offensive of savage capitalism under-
pinned by the United States and the European Union, but also for
Germany to take up the initiative in the region again, throwing fuel into
the fire –through its recognition of the independence of Slovenia and
Croatia, which the European Union itself reaffirmed– and consequent-
ly accelerating the splitting asunder of Yugoslavia and the civil war.
C u r i o u s l y, the Europeans attempted to impose in Bosnia the coexis-
tence of the communities that they had insisted on separating! If it is
possible for Serbs, Croats and Muslims to coexist in the tiny Yu g o s l a v i a
that Bosnia turns out to be, why couldn’t they have coexisted in the
large Yugoslavia? Evidently, a strategy of this type would not have had
any success, which allowed the United States to intervene in the very
heart of Europe. In Wa s h i n g t o n ’s strategy, the Balkans-Caucasus-
Central Asia axis is a prolongation of the Middle East.
From the analyses proposed above and which concern the polit-
ical and strategic options of the countries of the Northern Coast of the
Mediterranean I extract an important conclusion: the majority of
these countries, yesterday faithful backers of the United States in the
East-West conflict, continue aligned with the American strategy of
hegemony vis-à-vis the Third World, and particularly vis-à-vis the Arab
countries and those of the Red Sea-Gulf region. The other countries
(Balkanic and of the Danube), yesterday involved in some manner or
another in the East-West conflict, have ceased to be active agents in
the permanent North-South conflict, and have turned into passive
objects in the face of Western expansionism.
Conclusions: the Empire of Chaos and the permanent
war
I have termed the project of dominance of the United States –the exten-
sion of the Monroe doctrine to the entire planet, particularly since the
collapse of Soviet Russia (1991)– the Empire of Chaos. The growth of
the resistance of the nations of the Old World announces that they will
not accept submitting so easily. The United States will be called on to
substitute international law by recourse to permanent warfare (a
process that has begun in the Middle East, but which already points
toward Russia and Asia), slipping down the fascist slope (the “Patriot
Act” has already given its police powers with regard to foreigners
–“aliens”– that turn out to be similar to those the Gestapo had).
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Will the European states, partners in the system of collective imperi-
alism of the triad, accept this drift that will place them in subordinate
positions? The thesis which I have developed places the accent not so
much on the conflicts of interest of the dominant capital as on the dif-
ference that separates the political cultures of Europe from that which
characterizes the historic shaping of the United States, and finds in
this new contradiction one of the main reasons for the probable fail-
ure of the United States’ project6.
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